


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A Statement *of the* Views
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Chinese Government
on the
Report *of the* Commission
of
Enquiry

Statement



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A Statement of the Views of the Chinese Government on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry

Delivered by V. K. Wellington Koo at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, Geneva, November 21, 1932.



BEFORE I proceed to state the views of the Chinese Government, I would like to say a word about the speech of the Japanese Representative this morning. If we were to accept all that he said, we would have to believe that Japan was like a meek lamb in the teeth of ferocious China, struggling for her existence. But, fortunately, the Council is now in possession of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, relating the actual situation from a disinterested point of view.

Several points were raised in the Japanese statement of this morning, which are also dealt with in the statement I am about to read. There are, however, other points in the said speech, as well as certain contentions of Japan in the printed "Observations" which was only circulated last evening; I would like to reserve our comments for another occasion. One striking point in the speech was the complaint of the present conditions in China. In the course of my statement today, I shall have an opportunity to throw some light on why Japan never ceases to complain of the conditions in China. But even assuming for the sake of argument that the Japanese claim was not entirely incorrect, the question might be asked: "Does such a situation justify armed invasion by Japan and military occupation of China's three rich Provinces by the Japanese troops—the area of those Provinces is equal to that of France and Germany combined?"

The Japanese representative also contended that the operations of the Japanese army in Manchuria were acts of self-defence and he invoked the authority of the express reservations of the principal Powers of the Kellogg-Briand Anti-war Pact. But he also explained that the Japanese Army had a comprehensive plan and that when the alarm once arose, its action was almost automatic. He prided himself that a plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision, as stated in the Lytton report. However, he did not tell you that the Chinese had no plan on their side either for aggression or for defence, as confirmed by

the Report of the Commission. On the evening of September 18th to 19th when the Japanese Army put its plan into operation with machine guns and field artillery, the Chinese troops withdrew and offered no resistance whatsoever. In the light of this one fact alone, could we consider the action of the Japanese army as a measure of self-defence? If such actions on the part of the Japanese military forces could be considered as measures of self-defence within the terms of the Kellogg-Briand Anti-war Pact and within the purport of the reservations the Japanese representative has cited, the question might well be asked as to the necessity of upholding this great instrument of peace. But I am sure the gentlemen of the Council, some of whom may have participated in this remarkable compact for the promotion of peace, know better and I am content to leave it to their own interpretation. With these few words I propose to proceed to give the views of the Chinese Government in relation to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry.

The work of the Commission of Enquiry, which has crystallized in the Report now before the Council, cannot be too highly praised. Public opinion in China is justly enthusiastic in paying a tribute to Lord Lytton and his colleagues, together with their staff of secretaries and experts, for the able manner in which they have discharged their important mission; but I wish to take this opportunity officially to express the appreciation of the Chinese Government. For nine months they travelled and toiled under varied conditions and changing climates. As Chinese Assessor, it was my privilege to be associated with them for most part of the period, and I am pleased now to be able to bear personal testimony to the devotion and conscientiousness with which they, one and all, performed their duties which were at times delicate as well as strenuous. Neither the rigour of winter nor the heat of summer made a difference to them in the prosecution of their task; their unremitting energy and profound sense of responsibility evoked admiration from all.

While the unnecessary obstacles placed in the way of the visit of the Chinese Assessor to Manchuria in association with the Commission caused anxiety to the Commissioners, the unusual restrictions placed upon him and his staff upon arrival in Manchuria as regards their movement and right of communication deprived the Commission of much of the assistance which it was the Chinese Assessor's duty to render in its investigations on the spot, and to which it was entitled under the Council Resolution of December 10th last. On several occasions the Chinese Assessor was constrained to draw the attention of the Commission to "the

embarrassment and inconveniences to which he and his staff were subjected and which unnecessarily restricted their freedom of movement and hampered the performance of their duties." While in Mukden, he wrote to the Commission on April 27th, 1932, in part:

"Not only is every member of the Chinese Delegation followed by one or more police agents when he goes out, but in Yamato Hotel there are a large number of police agents on watch. The Chinese Assessor is followed even when visiting another room, or going to the dining room in the hotel. It has been observed on several occasions that the number of the room visited was recorded and his visitors were noted.

"At the Oriental Hotel, where part of the Chinese Delegation are staying, the situation is even more trying. Some ten police agents keep watch on the ground floor and the Chinese members have been persistently told by them that whenever any of the members left the Hotel he should notify the detectives stationed in the building so that they might detail special men to "protect" him. While remaining in the Hotel they are not able to enjoy privacy in their rooms. The police agents freely enter the rooms of the Chinese members and ask them questions at all hours. . . .

"The Chinese Delegation is entirely cut off from communication. No Chinese are permitted to call on any one of the Chinese members in the Oriental Hotel or at the Yamato. Several instances of arrests have been known. . . ."

Again at Changchun he sent a memorandum to the Commission on May 3rd last relating to the intervention of the Japanese police agents when he was receiving a visit from two foreign missionaries in his room at the Yamato Hotel. Among other things it was stated:

"Upon opening the door he noticed a body of five or six Japanese, one of them, apparently the headman, insisted upon entering the room and knowing who the visitors were and what was the object of their call. The man was ascertained to be the Chief of the Senior Section of the Police of Changchun (of the Police of Kwangtung Leased Territory). He entered the room, and it was only after the Chinese Assessor himself had stepped out of his room that he could be induced to leave the room. At this stage Mr. Astor, of the Commission, happened to be passing by and his friendly interposition brought out the point that what the Japanese police chief was anxious to know was whether the Chinese Assessor had received permission from the Japanese Police to receive

callers, or whether the callers had been given permission to call upon the Chinese Assessor."

At Kirin the Chinese Assessor was "escorted" about by Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets and in Harbin by policemen in uniform as well as plain-clothes agents.

As a consequence of the unwarranted restrictions and prohibitions, the Chinese Assessor was prevented from either visiting in company with the Commission the scene of incidents to be investigated or arranging for the presentation of Chinese witnesses to the Commission.

Nor was any Chinese in Manchuria permitted to visit the Chinese Assessor or the Commission without previous approval of the Japanese authorities. As the Report on page 107 states:

"But the effect of the police measures adopted was to keep away witnesses; and many Chinese were frankly afraid of even meeting members of our staff. We were informed at one place that, before our arrival, it had been announced that no one would be allowed to see the Commission without official permission. Interviews were therefore usually arranged with considerable difficulty and in secrecy, and many informed us that it was too dangerous for them to meet us even in this way. . . . Most of the delegations were introduced by the Japanese or 'Manchukuo' authorities, and we had strong grounds for believing that the statements left with us had previously obtained Japanese approval."

Such treatment accorded by the Japanese authorities to the Chinese Assessor and his staff in Manchuria which is an integral part of Chinese territory, is a striking contrast with the utmost freedom and fullest facilities extended to the Japanese Assessor in all parts of China Proper. In Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow, Peiping and other places, there never was any attempt on the part of the Chinese authorities to interfere in any way with his freedom of presenting his own nationals as witnesses to the Commission, or with Japanese subjects desiring to see the Commission in order to present their views.

With these ~~brief~~ preliminary remarks, I wish to make a few observations on some of the more important questions and facts presented in the Report.

One allegation which has been made by Japan ostensibly to justify her unwarranted course of action in China, particularly in Manchuria,

but really to confuse public opinion and conceal the real issue, is that China is "not an organized state." The use of such language in referring to my country, an original member of the League of Nations, not only reflects a want of propriety but also betrays a sense of hopelessness to find a really sound argument for Japan's case. There is no mystery in the fact that China, in the present period of transforming herself from an old empire of 4,000 years into a modern democracy, is now undergoing a period of trials and tribulations familiar to students of political history and inevitable in the reconstruction of any country. The apparent disarray of factors and forces in the country is nothing but a symbol of rigour and vitality in a re-awakened people; it is evidence of progress in the re-building of a country of 450 million people. The spectacle of China in transition may not be entirely pleasant to view, but it is not different from the sight of an old structure in the process of remodelling. The important point is, to quote the words of the Commission's Report, that "in spite of difficulties, delays and failures, considerable progress has in fact been made." (Page 17.)

Realizing this need for a period of transition for China, the signatory Powers of the Nine Power Treaty, concluded at Washington on February 6th, 1922, including Japan, have engaged "to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." But one of the greatest difficulties with which China has been confronted in her task of unification and reconstruction, is Japan's repeated attempts to embarrass her and to prevent its accomplishment. For example, in a Japanese pamphlet entitled "*The Activities of Japanese Nationals and Troops in Manchuria and Mongolia*," the author, Baron Goto, a well-known Japanese statesman, gives us the essential facts of a Japanese attempt, in the early years of the Chinese Republic, to organize a monarchical movement in the Three Eastern Provinces and overthrow President Yuan Shih-Kai, who was then on the point of achieving complete unification in China. It is therein frankly stated that the Japanese financier Kihachiro Okura made a loan to Prince Su, a prominent member of the Manchurian Imperial Family, in order to carry out the plot immediately and that, to quote Baron Goto's own statement, "Colonel Doi, a Japanese commissioned officer and commander of the 5th Regiment, was then ordered to bring with him a large number of Japanese non-commissioned officers to organize and plan for the anti-Yuan Shih-Kai armies." But let us give one or two instances of more recent date which are still fresh in our memory. The sudden despatch of a large body of Japanese troops to Tsinanfu, capital of Shantung Province, in 1927 and again in 1928, on the pretext of protecting Japanese nationals who were in no way endangered, was really

for the purpose of obstructing the advance of the ever victorious National Army under General Chiang Kai-shek and to prevent him from bringing North China under the jurisdiction of the National Government at Nanking. The threatening declaration of the Japanese Government under the premiership of Baron Tanaka on May 28th, 1928, that Japan might possibly be constrained to take appropriate effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, should disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin, a declaration followed by the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin in the blowing up of his train under a railway bridge of the South Manchurian Railway patrolled by Japanese guards, had the same object in view. This object was disclosed in full, when the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, the Special Envoy Baron Hayashi and Brigadier-General Sato, one after another, warned General Chang Hsueh-liang against pledging his allegiance to the Central Government at Nanking and flying the national flag. On August 9th, 1928, General Chang Hsueh-liang on return visit to Baron Hayashi at the Japanese Consulate was again warned to the same effect and when he questioned the reasonableness of the Japanese attitude, General Sato said:

"This is not the time to argue what is or is not reasonable. Premier Tanaka has already decided that you should not fly the new flag and that is reason enough."

It is a singular, yet a significant fact to be noted that Japan, while never ceasing to complain to the world of a disunited China, persistently pursues a policy of preventing unification in China. It raises the question whether Japan really wants to see China united. There is evidently a sense of apprehension lest a united China would be a blow to her policy of expansion and to her dream of world conquest. This fear is gently hinted in the Report when it says (page 131) that "at the heart of the problem for Japan, lies her anxiety concerning the political development of modern China, and the future to which it is tending."

The importance of the question how well-organized a given state is, lies in its effect upon the relations of that state with the outside world. Reliable indications of this fact are found among a number of factors. One of these is the growth of foreign trade. In this respect China's record compares well with that of any country. In spite of the impression which has been studiously cultivated abroad for many years by a hostile and exceedingly well-organized propaganda, China has during the past two decades been making an ever increasing contribution to the economy of the world. The statistics of her foreign trade speak for

China's condition louder than the words of our Japanese critics. Our total foreign trade in 1911 was 849,000,000 *taels* (the value of a *tael* is about that of a Swiss franc and a half now); in 1921 it was 1,500,000,000; and in 1930 it was 2,204,000,000. In other words, in the last twenty years, China's trade with the outside world has increased by 158%.

Another reasonable index of the degree of perfection of a State's political organization lies in the loyalty and effectiveness of its cooperation with other nations in upholding the sanctity of international instruments. Such cooperation is an indispensable condition for the new order of international life and for the organization of peace in the world. Measured by this standard, one cannot help asking oneself how well organized is Japan as a nation? The real difficulty of the Manchurian question before the League now is Japan's failure to respect her international engagements, such as those clearly stipulated in the great instruments of peace, i.e., the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty, and to carry out her pledged word before the Council and the Assembly to withdraw her troops from Manchuria and refrain from aggravating the situation. Whether this failure is due to a native unwillingness on the part of the Japanese Government, or to a want of authority to enforce its will on the all-powerful military chiefs, its effect on the world at large is equally disturbing, as the League of Nations has experienced it in the past year and is still experiencing it today.

In this connection it is necessary, for a full appraisal of the situation in the Far East, to understand the purport and bearing of Japan's traditional policy of expansion mentioned in the Commission's Report. It is what the Japanese call the Continental Policy, that is, the policy of conquest on the Asiatic mainland, with two corollaries; the northward push, i.e., invasion into Manchuria and North China through Korea, and the southward push, i.e., invasion of Southern and Central China and the South Seas setting the base on Formosa. Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the 16th century advocated the subjugation of China. In his reply to the letter from the King of Korea, he said:

"Since we cannot live in this world for even one hundred years, how can we continue to confine ourselves in this little island? It has long been my ambition to conquer the Ming Dynasty (China) by way of your country. Our Emperor has expressed gratification at your readiness to establish relations with us by sending a delegate to our nation. I hope you will

despatch troops to help us when we mobilize our forces against the Ming Dynasty."

In the middle of the 19th century, the Memorial of Nabeshima, feudal lord of the Saga and guardian of the Hizen, states:

"The Shogun has been known as the great General whose mission is to conquer barbarous tribes. These two words, 'conquer barbarians,' are Japan's immutable policy. Because of the long duration of peace the spirit of our people has deteriorated. Now is the time to retrieve our waning fortune and lay a firm foundation for our national greatness by spreading our prowess abroad."

Oki Takato, who enthusiastically advocated the subjugation of Korea and the partition of China before the days of Saigo Takamori, in the course of his criticism of Japanese policy, has this to say:

"Russia is the country that is most to be feared. She is in the best position to check in an effective way the carrying out of Japan's continental policy. If we are determined to pursue such a policy we should enter into an alliance with Russia whereby each shall have an equal share of Chinese territory."

I have quoted the above passages not for their historical interest but on account of their important bearing upon Japan's contemporary policy vis-à-vis China and the Far East. The spirit underlying these remarkable statements and the policy therein advocated remain the spirit and policy of modern Japan. They are as virile and real as they were when first expounded by these idols of the Japanese people. On March 31st, 1922, an important meeting of the highest ranking army and navy officers was held in Tokyo and new plans for war were formulated. The *Yomiuri Shimbum*, a Tokyo daily paper, published the following day an account of the meeting and stated that the Supreme War Council had decided that in case of war Japan should immediately "establish close communications with the Asiatic mainland in an area commencing from Hankow, Shantung up to Harbin and Karafuto (Sakhalin) which would constitute her first line of defence." Concerning the scheme of military operations, it makes the following startling revelations:

"To strengthen her own defence Japan should first of all augment her garrison forces in Formosa, Karafuto and Korea. In order to be adequately supplied with war materials for a long struggle and to ensure ultimate victory, Japan should at all costs establish unhampered access to the coal and iron producing centers at Hanyang and Pinghsiang. To forestall swift changes in her international relations, Japan should take over Peking; and to assure herself of a ready supply of provisions from Manchuria, Mukden and Changchun should be placed under her occupation."

General Yamanashi, Minister of War, in reply to the interpellations in the Imperial Diet in the spring of 1922 concerning the new plans of war and national defence decided by the Supreme War Council, said:

"The country (meaning England) which has hitherto been in close friendly relations with us has now chosen to abrogate the treaty of Alliance. In case of war, Japan will find herself confronted with the threat of an economic blockade. Japan, in such a contingency, must place the Continent (meaning China) and Siberia under her military occupation in order to assure herself of an adequate supply of food and war materials."

The double-armed Continental Policy of Expansion, which is the crystallization of several centuries of teaching by Japanese warriors, is aimed at China as the first stage of the conquest of Asia, and to be carried out from the North and from the South just as a virulent scorpion attacking its victim by its foreclaws and its tail. It enables us to understand why Japan, on the termination of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-5, insisted upon China's cession to her of the Liaotung Peninsula and the Island of Formosa. It helps us to appreciate the full significance of her seizure of the Liuchu Islands from China in 1879; her occupation of South Manchuria after the war with Russia and her annexation of Korea; her despatch of troops to Hankow in the heart of the Yangtze Valley in 1911; her occupation of Shantung from 1914-1922; her sudden presentation of the Twenty-one Demands to China in 1915; her hesitation to withdraw her military expedition to Eastern Siberia; her sending of a large force of troops to Tsinanfu in 1927 and 1928; and lastly her attack upon Mukden and other cities on the night of September 18th-19th, 1931; and her practical occupation of whole Manchuria and her refusal to

evacuate against the public opinion of an entire world and in spite of her own pledges and undertakings. In the light of the words of Oki Takato I have quoted, we are able to gauge her real intention in seeking and concluding a series of secret conventions with Russia in 1907, 1910, 1912 and 1916 dividing with her Manchuria and Mongolia, and secret exchanges of notes with other Powers in 1917 with reference to Shantung and South Manchuria. It also enables us to understand her recent attempt to secure an alliance in Europe.

It is this Continental Policy known to all the leaders of modern China, which is a real menace to the peace in the Far East and a disturbing factor in the comity of nations. The danger is all the greater to peace, because behind this policy there is a dominating, untractable military party provided with one of the most powerful war machines in existence and ever seeking its full realization by means of force and the mailed fist. The apparent instability of conditions in China inseparable from the present period of her transition, while it should not be unnecessarily prolonged, does not of itself jeopardize the new order of international life based upon the rule of law and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. It is the unceasing effort of Japanese militarists to place obstacles in the path of China's unification, to add to her internal difficulties and to exploit her suffering from such misfortunes as flood and Communistic disturbances, all for the purpose of pushing forward her policy of expansion and conquest on the continent—it is this circumstance which more than any other threatens to disturb and disturbs peace between China and Japan and the good understanding between them upon which peace depends. The history of Sino-Japanese relations during the past sixty years is replete with proofs of this fact. The long series of wars, military expeditions and acts of aggression, which I have a little while ago mentioned and which were carried out at different times and places, are but varied phases of the one and same traditional, immutable policy of expansion, domination and conquest.

It is to be noted that the objectives of this policy are not confined to acquisition of Manchuria and Mongolia. According to the Memorial to the Throne of General Tanaka, former Premier of Japan—a document which was frequently referred to in the Japanese press before the Manchuria situation arose in September, 1931, without ever raising any doubt as to its authenticity, the control of China's Three Eastern Provinces is but one step in the program of world domination. It says: "In the future, if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order

to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence."

Nor is this plan considered by present-day Japan to be a matter of merely historical interest. In the light of the writings and utterances of prominent Japanese statesmen and soldiers today, it appears that the ambitious policy underlying the passage just quoted still holds sway and is now the guiding force in Japan. In the plan of national reorganization drafted in 1919 by Mr. Ikki Kita which has become, as it were, the bible of young officers, it is stated: "The State has the right to declare and make war for the defence of the country or the liberation of the oppressed peoples, for example, in order to deliver India from the English yoke and China from foreign oppression." In another place it states: "The State has equally the right to make war on nations who possess territories of exaggerated extent or which are managed in an inhuman manner. Example: To tear away Australia from Great Britain and Siberia from Russia." Mr. Kaku Mori, chief secretary of the last Cabinet, writing in the economic magazine called *Diamond* (July, 1932), states "The Japanese people are locked in their own territories by treaties. As long as the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact are construed in their present sense, Japan cannot expand in the East. If we are to progress we must break down this defence of treaties." Just one more quotation. The well-known General Araki, who is the Minister of War in the present Tokyo Cabinet, writes in a recent issue of *Kaikoshia-Kiji*, the Army Club magazine, an article which summons the Japanese people to be faithful to their national spirit and goes on to say: "The countries of Eastern Asia are object of oppression by white people. This is an undeniable fact, and Japan should no longer let the impertinence go unpunished. It is the duty of the people of Japan to oppose every action by the Powers which is not in accordance with the spirit of the Empire, which is the embodiment of righteousness and justice. Japan cannot close her eyes to any disturbance in any part of Eastern Asia, for unrest cannot be permitted to exist side by side with the fundamental spirit of the Empire. It is expected of every Japanese that he be ready to take his part, spiritually and materially, in restoring peace, even through resort to arms."

Such is the spirit and scope of the Japanese policy. As to the method of seeking its realization, the publication of the Memoirs of

Baron Mutsu, who as Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs throughout the Sino-Japanese War over the Korea question in 1894-5, played a leading rôle in this far-reaching international drama, has thrown a great deal of light on this point. For many years there was confusion in the minds of the public in general as to the origin of the war, but this book leaves no doubt now as to Japan's responsibility for forcing it upon China. Japanese military and naval detachments had been sent to Korea in June, 1894, and placed under the orders of Mr. Oshima, Japanese Minister at Seoul. When contrary to his expectation, the situation in the capital of Korea had calmed down and his policy of making war on China was confronted with the possibility of delay in its fulfilment, Baron Mutsu sent telegraphic instructions to Mr. Oshima telling him that the time had come for decisive action and peremptorily ordering him, to quote his own words, "to use any pretext to commence positive action." For the guiding principle of Japan's policy, as the Japanese Foreign Minister himself explained in his *Memoirs*, was this: "In her military action Japan must keep the advantage of initiative but her diplomacy must strive to create the impression that she is forced into the situation."

As it was with Korea, so it is with Manchuria now. Reasons and arguments should be advanced as pretexts to justify Japan's unprovoked acts of aggression, but whether they are accepted by the world as sound or not, the object of aggression must be sought at all cost. As the Commission's Report states on page 77, "having made their reservation at Geneva, the Japanese continued to deal with the situation in Manchuria according to their plans."

On the subject of the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, to which Japan has always taken exception, I wish to add only a few observations to the Commissioner's Report which has already given an interesting account. The boycott is nothing but a measure of self-defence. It is a form of reaction against a given cause of external origin and beyond China's control. In the past 25 years there have been nine boycotts against Japanese goods. As the Report says on page 115, "If these boycotts are studied in detail, it will be found that each of them can be traced back to a definite fact, event or incident generally of a political nature and interpreted by China as directed against her material interests or detrimental to her national prestige." "Thus," continues the Report with a keen sense of appreciation of cause and effect, "the boycott of 1931 was started as a direct sequel to the massacre by Koreans in July, following the Wanpaoshan incident in June of that year, and has been accentuated by the events at Mukden in September and at Shanghai in January 1932." It ought to be mentioned here that this anti-Chinese

massacre extended over ten days from the 3rd to the 13th of July, 1931, and took place in seven different Korean cities with the connivance, if not instigation, of the Japanese police, resulting in the killing of 142 peaceful Chinese citizens, 91 missing and 546 wounded, and in loss of property amounting to over 4,000,000 yen. The attack on Shanghai, centre of Chinese wealth and leading metropolis of the Far East, levied a toll of 24,000 lives killed and wounded and a loss of \$1,500,000,000 in property destroyed. The ruthless slaughter of Chinese lives and wanton destruction of Chinese property which is still going on in Manchuria, as a result of the Japanese invasion, is beyond computation.

It is true that Shanghai is the centre of the present boycott. But is it to be wondered at that the Chinese people at Shanghai should be most active in this form of retaliation when they have not only heard of the undeclared war in Manchuria, as an integral part of China, but have personally experienced the suffering for five weeks in February and March last, and seen the Japanese troops withdraw in May only to rush to North Manchuria to assist other Japanese troops in their work of slaughter and destruction? When I was with the Commission of Enquiry in Harbin, in the middle of May last, the newly arrived 14th division of Japanese troops from Shanghai for days and nights marched by in detachments of varying sizes in the street just under the windows of our hotel rooms to carry on the war of aggression. The flare of gunfire greeted our vision, while the booming of Japanese artillery and rattling of Japanese machine-gun were easily audible, each day and night killing no one knows how many more Chinese people. It was tragic and deplorable, but no one was able to stop it. One could imagine the feelings of the Chinese people in other parts of China, who learned of the fate of the Three Eastern Provinces and of their fellow-countrymen therein. It is against the policy of wanton aggression on the part of Japan, that the present boycott has been, and is still, maintained.

When one takes these facts into consideration, one will understand why not only individual Chinese refuse to buy Japanese goods, but even public organizations actively participate in the movement, with a view to making the boycott as effective as possible. Realizing the weakness of their country in arms and armaments, they manifest this indignation and protest against the wrong done to China by Japan by this self-denying method of retaliation. For, in thus bringing this economic pressure to bear upon Japan, they, especially the merchants, sustain considerable loss to themselves. It is a sacrifice on their part. In fact, no Japanese goods which were the property of Japanese nationals were

confiscated; and if some were seized under a misapprehension, they were always released when their ownership was fully ascertained.

In such a spontaneous popular movement, no government could entirely keep aloof, and when fully sharing the prevailing sense of wrong and injustice done to the country, of whose security from external aggression it is, in the eyes of the people, the acknowledged guardian, it cannot help sympathizing with, and giving countenance to, such a movement. Besides, it is a measure of legitimate defence, which the Central Government could not refuse to countenance. On the contrary, the intensity of popular feeling aroused by Japan's unprovoked war on China—for it is war "in disguise"—has rendered it necessary, on occasions, to issue orders to the local authorities, for the purpose of guiding the movement within lawful bounds and better ensuring the safety of Japanese life and property. It has been due to such vigilance, on the part of the Chinese Government, that, as confirmed by the Commission's Report, so few untoward incidents have occurred throughout the period since the commencement of Japanese invasion in Manchuria.

The question has been raised as to the possible implication of a measure of responsibility on the part of the Chinese Government, if there has been official guidance of the present organized boycott of Japanese goods. In the opinion of the Chinese Government, no responsibility could justly be attributed to it. In the face of such wanton and premeditated aggression, as characterizes the Japanese military activities in Manchuria and China Proper, every form of resistance, it is submitted, would be justifiable as legitimate defence. While seeking a peaceful settlement through the League, in conformity with the Covenant, and awaiting a decision, it is necessary, in the meantime, to check, if possible, the steady advance of the invading forces and their continued aggravation of the situation, lest each new situation should be regarded as an accomplished fact and be assigned the importance of a reality. China, faithful to her policy of peace and forbearance, chose this pacific mode of resistance. It is believed that this form of pressure on the invading country is more humane in that it does not entail killing and bloodshed, which would be unavoidable in the case of resisting force with force. That injury has been done to Japanese interests is to be expected. It is, however, incomparable to the loss of tens of thousands of Chinese lives and to the destruction of billions of dollars of Chinese property, inflicted by the Japanese army in Manchuria, in Shanghai, and in Tientsin.

Amidst such a popular movement animated with a feeling of patriotic indignation, it is possible that methods not fully in conformity

with the law, in its strict terms, have, sometimes, been employed by the more zealous participants to make the boycott more effective. But when one remembers that three richest of their Provinces have been invaded and occupied by the Japanese military forces without provocation, their conduct might be considered as justifiable. The question may be asked as to what would happen in another country, if subjected to such a grievous wrong and confronted with such an imminent threat to its existence. In the present circumstances, it might not, perhaps, be unreasonable for the Chinese Government to legalize the present nationwide boycott of Japanese companies and Japanese merchandises, and thereby, to ensure more uniform methods of enforcing it. That it has not yet done so, is characteristic of its policy of restraint and moderation.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that China has applied the boycott against Japanese aggression only with great reluctance because, as has just been stated, while it is directed as a defence against Japanese military aggression, it entails considerable loss and sacrifice upon the Chinese people. Loving peace and always pursuing a policy in favor of peaceful adjustment of international disputes, she would have infinitely favored arbitration as a method of settlement with Japan. She could not wish too earnestly that Japan, militarily a stronger nation than China, had tried to arrange whatever claims she might have desired to present against her, by any one of the peaceful methods provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations, of which she herself is a member. But, instead, the Japanese military authorities committed Japan, at the outset, to a policy of force, and plunged into the execution of a well-prepared plan of aggression and conquest. In the view of the Chinese Government, the vigorous application of the boycott against Japan is entirely necessary, the more so as redress by the League requires time. The experience of the past fourteen months appears to have justified its opinion. Not only has the Japanese Government not yet fulfilled its engagement under the Council Resolutions of September 30th and December 10th last, by withdrawing the Japanese forces within the so-called South Manchurian Railway Zone, but has, on the contrary, permitted them to continue their operations until, today, practically all the Three Eastern Provinces have been occupied by them. Nor has the League of Nations, during all this long period, as yet found an effective way, either of preventing the continued aggravation of the situation there, politically and militarily, by the Japanese troops, or of enforcing its Resolution, requiring their promised withdrawal. To deny China the use of boycott against such Japanese military aggression as has been going on in Manchuria for over a year, would be the denial of a legitimate and peaceful instrument of defence. Moreover, in the present economy of the world, the adoption and application of prohibitive tariffs, quota systems, and

exchange restrictions, is a generally approved practice. If such measures are favorably countenanced today, as legitimate measures of self-defence against economic encroachments, is there not greater justification then for the employment of the boycott, which is, in all its essentials, a measure of similar character, as an instrument of legitimate defence against military aggression?

The question whether the organized application of the boycott to the nation of Japan is consistent with friendly relations, or in conformity with treaty obligations, does not arise in the present case, until another preliminary question is determined, namely, whether, after the massacre of an appalling number of peaceful Chinese nationals in Korea, and in the face of the unprovoked military invasion of Chinese territory and unceasing wanton destruction of Chinese life and property in Manchuria, Shanghai and elsewhere, the relations with Japan could still be considered as friendly, and whether China ought still to be held, on her side to the scrupulous observance of reciprocal treaty obligations, which Japan, by her flagrant acts of violation, has deliberately thrown to the winds.

It is sincerely hoped that the foregoing observations will be found helpful in the consideration of the question of the boycott of Japanese goods, and will contribute to a fuller appreciation of its real purport and meaning.

While Chinese nationalism has been rapidly developing, there is really no anti-foreign sentiment at its bottom. It is true that public opinion in China desires to see certain concessions and rights of a political character restored to China as essential attributes of sovereignty, but no serious minded Chinese are in favor of the attainment of this object otherwise than by the recognized method of negotiation and agreement. Here and there one might see posters on an isolated wall or hear speeches made from a school platform announcing their views on the existing basis of relations between China and foreign nations. These, however, do not reflect the sober views of the country at large any more than the fulminations of the Communistic press in the West.

Chinese Nationalism, as preached by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and as one of the Three People's Principles of the Kuomintang, is defensive, pacific and constructive. It is the reaction of her past experience in her intercourse with the outside world. It is an expression of a national desire to free China from the restrictions of the unequal treaties and to place her on a footing of equality with other nations of the world. That is

why it is defensive and pacific. It is also constructive because it aims to reach Internationalism through the means of Nationalism. China desires to develop into a strong and prosperous nation in order to contribute to the peace and happiness of the whole world, which is ultimately to develop into a Great Commonwealth of all nations. This political idealism can be traced, in its origin, to the teachings of ancient Chinese sages, including Confucius, and Dr. Sun further developed it and incorporated it in the principles and program of the Kuomintang.

There exists, however, a nation-wide sentiment against the traditional policy of Japan which is aimed at the control and conquest of China. Each new incident or conflict brings out this policy in clearer relief as to its true meaning and consequence upon the safety and existence of China as a nation. The people of China do not consider the present situation in Manchuria as an isolated event in their relations with Japan, but view it, as they must if they are to understand it in all its bearing and effect, in the light of Japan's continental policy of expansion and conquest which I have described above. As correctly stated by the Commission of Enquiry in its Report (page 23), "In recent years the claims of Japan have come to be regarded in China as contributing a more serious challenge to national aspirations than the rights of all the other Powers taken together." And they are so regarded by the Chinese people, not out of mere suspicion, but from their knowledge and experience in the past decades.

As regards other countries, there is no anti-foreignism. In fact it is the sincere desire of the Government and people of China to be on the friendliest terms with them for mutual interest and welfare. I need not dilate upon this point: a reference to a few facts will suffice to make it clear. There are over 360,000 foreign nationals and over 8,200 foreign firms in China living and working in peace. Of them 7,567 are missionaries scattered in the interior parts of the country, carrying on their religious work without molestation or hindrance. Incidents are rare and far between. Even the thousands of Japanese nationals in China Proper who are under the protection of the Chinese authorities, are living in security, and few cases of trouble have occurred, notwithstanding the state of tension between the two countries.

Besides, another significant fact is that the personnel of China's different state services includes hundreds of foreign nationals. In the various ministries of the Central Government, there are over 40 foreign experts of 8 nationalities engaged to assist in the administration, and their number is constantly growing. The Report itself bears testimony to this

spontaneous desire of the Chinese Government to secure cooperation from abroad. "The National Government, too," says the Report, "has in recent years sought and accepted international help in the solution of her problems—in financial matters since 1930, in matters relating to economic planning and development in liaison with the technical organizations of the League of Nations since the constitution of the National Economic Council in 1931, and in relief of the distress caused by the great flood of the same year." More recently, specialists have been invited to China through the good offices of the League to study problems in education, hygiene, conservancy, agriculture and the silk industry. If there were a real anti-foreign sentiment in China, such a comprehensive policy of cooperation could not have been achieved with so much success and satisfaction.

Having set forth the few foregoing observations on some of the more serious allegations made by the Japanese evidently with the purpose of concealing the real issue of the Sino-Japanese dispute, and having invited your attention especially to the fact that it is the Japanese policy of expansion and conquest which constitutes the real menace to the peace of the Far East, may I now be permitted to proceed to indicate certain important findings in the Commission's Report which clarify those points of fact most relevant to the issue?

In the light of the exaggerated claims and extraordinary demands made by Japan in explanation of the Japanese action in Manchuria on September 18th, 1931 and thereafter, China notes with interest the findings of the Report which have lifted a veil of mystery on a number of important points. Japan has claimed that there were "three hundred unsettled cases" and that it was to secure a satisfactory settlement that she was forced to resort to military action against China in Manchuria. But the Report says on page 66:

"The claim that there were 300 cases outstanding between the two countries and that peaceful methods for the settling each of them had been progressively exhausted by one of the parties cannot be substantiated."

Having disposed of this matter we note from the Report that in Japan, "settlement of all pending issues, if necessary by force, became a popular slogan." The Report continues:

"Reference was freely made in the Press to a decision to

resort to armed force, to conferences between the Ministry of War, the General Staff and other authorities for the discussion of a plan with this object, to definite instructions regarding the execution, in case of necessity, of that plan to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and to Colonel Doihara, Resident Officer at Mukden, who had been summoned to Tokyo early in September and who was quoted by the Press as the advocate of a solution of all pending issues, if necessary by force and as soon as possible. The reports of the Press regarding the sentiments expressed by these circles and some other groups point to a growing and dangerous tension."

The Report goes on to call attention (page 66) to the "Vigorous speeches of the Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counselling direct action by their army in Manchuria." The provocative night manoeuvres of the Japanese troops about Mukden, with frequent firing of their arms, are noted in the Report and then the rapidly succeeding events of September 18th and 19th, 1931, which according to the Report were "the first step of a movement which resulted in the military occupation of practically the whole of Manchuria" (page 66). It was therefore the intervention of Japan through her military authority which brought about the present crisis in the relations between China and Japan and not the fact of the unsettled claims of each country vis-à-vis the other. Regarding the unsettled disputes the Commission further observes that "they were of such a nature as could have been composed by arbitral and judicial processes."

Was the military action of September 18th and 19th, 1931, as the Japanese claim, a measure of self-defence? The answer to this question is of the utmost importance, not only to China, but to the League itself, in consideration of the specific stipulation of the Covenant. The Japanese claim that their invasion of Manchuria is an act of self-defence. Regarding this the Commission of Enquiry came to the following conclusions which do not support the Japanese claim. Let the Commission speak for itself:

"Tense feeling undoubtedly existed between the Japanese and Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18th-19th, this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese,

in accordance with the instructions referred to on page 69, had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations."

The Japanese claim that Chinese soldiers blew up the South Manchuria railway near Mukden at about 10 o'clock in the evening of September 18th. They created this pretext in order to touch off the Japanese military machine which was already conducting provocative night manoeuvres in the proximity of a great Chinese camp and barracks, and without prior arrangements satisfactory to the Chinese authorities. We now have the Report of the Lytton Commission in regard to the claim that the railway explosion caused the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The Report says:

"An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10:30 p.m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence."

This is an important point. If the so-called explosion near Mukden did not justify military action within its neighborhood, much less did it justify the simultaneous military invasion by the Japanese army on the same night of Chinese territory at points hundreds of miles distant at Changchun, Kirin and Yingkow. The Japanese attacked and burned the Chinese barracks, although orders had been issued to the Chinese forces, as the Commission observes, not to reply in force to aggression by the Japanese army.

Nor has the Commission failed to call attention to what we may describe as a ruthless effort of the Japanese army to "root out," as their proclamations themselves claim, the Chinese civilian authority in the Three Eastern Provinces. This drive against the civilian authority continued during the very period when the term of the Council's Resolution of September 30th was supposed to be effective, having been accepted by

Japan. The Council in "§2 recognizes the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria," and in §3 of the same Resolution notes the Japanese delegate's statement "that his Government will continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be" and §5 notes "That the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation."

But what were the facts? The Chinese officials of the province in which Mukden was the capital, including the Acting Governor, the Treasurer, the Education Commissioner and the Director of Public Safety, under the drive of the Japanese army, had been forced to evacuate the territory up to the city of Chinchow, many a mile distant from Mukden to the West. The Lytton Report says that the Japanese did not allow the Chinese to set up their civilian government in Chinchow, in succession to Mukden, but attempted to exterminate it. In fact, on October 8th, the seat of this Government in the University of Communications, the Hospital flying the Red Cross flag, the railway station and other unfortified places were repeatedly bombed by the Japanese, who also fired machine-guns into the buildings as they swooped down close overhead. Thus the Japanese army attempted to drive out every remnant of Chinese authority, essential to the maintenance of public order and the organization of Government in South Manchuria. Having destroyed authority at Chinchow, Kirin and many other parts of Manchuria following the Mukden incident, they have not ceased to complain of the lack of public order in Manchuria.

Such action would have been unaccountable had it not been intended to supplant the Chinese administration with a Japanese. China's expressed fears of that purpose were, as the Council and the Assembly well know, indignantly denied by the Japanese authorities. The Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Inukai, insisted—as late as December, 1931—that "Japan would not take Manchuria as a gift," to use his own words. At this very time, however, neutral news agencies, such as the Associated Press and Reuters, reported the most assiduous activity, on the part of the Japanese, in assuming civilian authority in Manchuria, either directly or through their puppets.

The purpose of calling to your attention the Chinchow incident of

October 8th, 1931, and the subsequent occupation of this place by force, by the Japanese army, and rapidly of all Chinese administrative centres in the Three Eastern Provinces, is for the following reason: It shows beyond a doubt the lack of good faith of the Japanese authorities, whose aggressions have continued to hamper the settlement of the issues at stake, and who have also continued to challenge the rule of law, as represented in the Covenant of the League.

Nor have we begun, as yet, to recount the extent to which Japan, by flouting the League, has brought suffering upon the Chinese people. We wish to spare you, as far as possible, the recital of these painful details, but, at least, one more event of that character, should be referred to.

Contrary to Japan's assurances, not to create "any aggravation of the situation," a pledge given to the League not only on September 30th, but also on December 10th, a pledge which included the promise to refrain from any initiative which might lead to any further fighting or loss of life, Japan has made the greatest assault upon the territorial and administrative integrity of China in modern history. In fact, she has separated 30 million of our people from the other Chinese by armed force; she has chosen to set up puppet officials in place of those loyal to China; she and her puppets have seized the efficient, modern services of China in Manchuria, such as the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle; she has seized the Post-Office system, which was efficiently functioning everywhere, the telegraph lines and offices, the Chinese mines and railways, the Chinese radio and wireless stations, the Chinese Government treasuries and certain revenues already collected and held in reserve. No administrative steps can be taken today anywhere in Manchuria, without permission of the Japanese.

This is the process of progressive terrorization and assimilation which has taken place contrary to the most solemn assurances of the Japanese authorities to this League. These are the words of the Commission (page 127):

"It is a fact that, without declaration of war, a large area of what was indisputably the Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan and has, in consequence of this operation, been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China. The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed by Japan to have been consistent with

the obligations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, all of which were designed to prevent action of this kind."

Not only so, but Japan proceeded to invade China at Shanghai on January 28th, 1932. There, in addition to 24,000 Chinese casualties, the Japanese brought a material loss upon the unfortified city and its environs of 1 billion 500 million dollars silver, or about the equivalent in Swiss francs. The plan of resistance, by which the new Chinese army met the Japanese aggression at Shanghai, gave notice to all concerned that the population of China, capable of passive resistance on a large scale, is also capable of strong military resistance. This misadventure of the Japanese at Shanghai, however, did not stop Japan. Another striking act of defiance on her part, was the formal recognition of the so-called "Government of Manchukuo," on September 14th last, which was consummated in a so-called Protocol, in utter disregard of her solemn engagements under the Covenant of the League and international treaties, as well as of her repeated pledges made in the Council.

Regarding the status of affairs in Manchuria, leading up to recognition, we respectfully refer the Members of the Council to these words in the Report of the Lytton Commission, on page 97:

"It is clear that the Independence Movement, which had never been heard of in Manchuria before September, 1931, was only made possible by the presence of the Japanese troops.

"A group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired, who were in close touch with the new political movement in Japan to which reference was made in Chapter IV, conceived, organized and carried through this movement, as a solution to the situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of September 18th.

"With this object, they made use of the names and actions of certain Chinese individuals, and took advantage of certain minorities among the inhabitants, who had grievances against the former administration.

"It is also clear that the Japanese General Staff realized from the start, or at least in a short time, the use which could be made of such an autonomy movement. In conse-

quence, they provided assistance and gave direction to the organizers of the movement. The evidence received from all sources has satisfied the Commission that, while there were a number of factors which contributed to the creation of 'Manchukuo,' the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which in our judgment, the new State could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military.

"For this reason, the present regime cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement."

Nothing more need be said in regard to the spurious claims of the Japanese that the separation of the Three Eastern Provinces of China from the mother-land was voluntary.

Such are some of the more important findings of facts in the Report and are the conclusions which come irresistibly from them by the force of logic. The question arises, what is to be the solution? The answer should be given by the coming session of the Extraordinary Assembly which has formally been seized of the Sino-Japanese Conflict since last February.

The Commission on its part, in order to facilitate discussion with the view to a settlement, has emphasized certain conditions and principles and certain considerations and suggestions to the Council. The Chinese Delegation wishes to reserve its right of presenting observations upon them till a later occasion when discussions take place. In the meanwhile, however, I wish to invite your attention to one of the conditions of settlement stated by the Report. It reads (page 130): "Any solution should conform to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington." This is a cardinal principle with all the sanctity of a solemn obligation for all the signatories of these great instruments for peace. The Chinese Government, on its part, has repeatedly insisted upon the necessity of respecting these instruments which, among others, consecrate either implicitly or formally the principle of respecting the sovereignty, political independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. Indeed, already on October 23rd, 1931, the representative of China declared in the Council: "Any discussions between China and other Power . . . must take place on the basis of Chinese rights and obligations under the Covenant and Pact of Paris, and must respect the principles laid down

at the Washington Conference of 1922." The Chinese Government has not ceased to reiterate this point of view. It is gratified therefore to see that its attitude is approved by the Report and declares itself ready to take as basis of discussion any recommendation in conformity with this great principle.

Flowing from this principle as its logical corollaries are certain supplementary principles which will further clarify the principal issues involved in the Sino-Japanese conflict and which will help to strengthen the foundations of world peace which we all wish to see preserved.

One of these principles is that no premium should be put on aggression. The Report is quite categorical in declaring that the Japanese military operations which started the whole conflict "cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence." In other words, these military operations constitute acts of aggression. Article 10 of the Covenant provides that "the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." It logically follows that China, being guaranteed against such external aggression, cannot be asked, nor expected, in consequence of such aggression, to renounce rights which she possessed prior to the aggression. On the other hand, it would be equally inadmissible that the aggressive nation should benefit from its policy of aggression by obtaining new rights to which it was not entitled before. The non-observance of this principle of justice and peace would be tantamount to placing a premium upon aggression, because it would then enable a state to derive advantages from an act which it was bound not to commit. This would create a dangerous precedent for the interests of peace. And the interests of peace, as it is well said in the Report, "are the same the world over. Any loss of confidence in the application of the principles of the Covenant and of the Pact of Paris in any part of the world diminishes the value and efficacy of those principles everywhere."

For the same reason, a State guaranteed against external aggression is entitled to reparation for damages sustained as the result of the aggression. The Chinese Government therefore reserves the right of claiming such reparation at the settlement of the conflict, in accordance with the statement already made by the Chinese representative at the Council meeting of December 10th, 1931: "China assumes that the said arrangement (referring to the Resolution of December 10th, 1931 creating the Commission of Enquiry and the declaration of the President of the Council) neither directly nor by implication affects the question of reparations

and damages to China and her nationals . . . and makes a specific reservation in that respect.”

It is obvious that the Resolutions of the Council and of the Extraordinary Assembly, insofar as they have not yet been carried out, remain in force as heretofore. Among others, the obligation undertaken by the Japanese Government as to the withdrawal of its troops in virtue of the Resolutions of September 30th and December 10th remains unchanged. This withdrawal is still an essential and previous condition to the fundamental settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute.

The Chinese Government in conformity with its repeated declarations on this subject and being convinced that the attitude of other members of the League of Nations on this point remains unchanged, is of the opinion that no settlement of the whole dispute could justly be discussed without recognizing the necessity that the pressure of military occupation and, what amounts to the same thing, the pressure of accomplished facts resulting from the use of force during such occupation, should first be terminated.

These are the principles which, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, should be given recognition in the consideration of any just and permanent settlement, if we are to accord the full value and respect which the Report of the Commission of Enquiry merits for its careful and important findings of facts, and if we are to safeguard the new order of international life in which is centered the hope of mankind for permanent peace.

Now let me conclude. I have said that the work of the Commission of Enquiry has called forth the well-deserved appreciation of the Government and people of China. I have told you something of the unnecessary obstacles which were placed in the way of the Chinese Assessor in Manchuria in order to prevent the performance of his duties to the Commission and which thus added to the difficulty of its important mission. I have tried to explain to you that behind the apparent instability of conditions in China there is a fundamental unity of purpose on the part of the Chinese people. Her task of unification has repeatedly been made more difficult by Japan's evident dread of a united China and her traditional policy to interfere with and prevent China's unification, while complaining loudly abroad of a disunited China. I have emphasized that it is Japan's so-called Continental Policy of Expansion which aims at domination and conquest of Asia and the world through the successive stages of controlling Korea and Formosa, Man-

churia and Mongolia, North China, Central China, South China and South Seas, and the territories beyond—it is this policy, which, as I have already stated, is a menace to the peace in the Far East and a serious disturbing factor to the rest of the world. I have also pointed out that there is no anti-foreign sentiment in China and the boycott of Japanese goods in China is the natural reaction on the part of the Chinese people against the flagrant Japanese aggression, and that they are obliged to resort to it as a necessary and peaceful instrument of legitimate defence, in spite of the great loss and suffering which it entails upon themselves.

I have drawn your attention to the more important findings of the Commission's Report and to its conclusions on some of the most vital points in the Manchurian situation.

I have laid stress upon the cardinal principle of respect for the international instruments of peace and the supplementary principles which are logical deductions from the findings and conclusions of the Report. These principles, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, should be firmly upheld in any permanent settlement.

The Report of the Commission of Enquiry, which the League of Nations eagerly awaited during the past ten months and in which it hoped to find a basis of settlement, has been made. It is now before us all. Thanks to the care and thoroughness with which the Commission investigated the leading points in controversy, this valuable document gives us a clear and comprehensive picture of the situation in Manchuria. The findings of facts and conclusions from them are lucidly stated. The time has come now for prompt and effective action by the League. Further hesitation will not only entail more bloodshed and suffering to the thirty million Chinese people in Manchuria, but will perhaps irretrievably shake the general confidence in the efficacy of this great institution of peace. On October 24th, 1931, M. Briand, the distinguished apostle of peace whose memory we all cherish, said, when presiding over the discussions of the same Sino-Japanese question in the Council, that "to prolong this situation would be to perpetuate a state of anxiety which has already lasted too long." More than a year since elapsed and this delay has meant to China tens of thousands more of innocent lives killed and literally billions of dollars more of property destroyed in consequence of the continued aggravation of the whole situation by Japan through her extended military operations in Manchuria, Shanghai and Tientsin. It has brought us to the place where there is not only a danger to China's existence, but also where a challenge is made to the League itself. It is only by a speedy and effective settlement of this conflict, in conformity

with the principles of justice and right clearly provided in the international instruments I have more than once referred to, that China hopes to have her wrong redressed and the instruments of world peace safeguarded.



